Although their work is somewhat distinct from IR in universities, these institutes are still important to disciplinary history as they honed a "scientific" method for the study of international affairs. 10 This empirical approach of studying IR to fit political agendas is evident today in research projects and publications of think-tanks globally. This paper tells the forgotten tale of the IIIA. Founded in 1936, this short-lived institute was caught in political and communal crossfires of the time. Although notionally independent from the government and aimed at promoting the objective study of world politics along the Chatham House model, our story reveals the farcical nature of this attempt. We show that from its founding, the Institute was tethered to the colonial Indian government and did no work at all, let alone "scientific"
research. The ICWA, in fact, emerged as a rival organisation to the IIIA in early 1940s, just as the anti-colonial movement in India reached its peak. The ruptures that eventually led to Partition were also inscribed in the emerging rivalry between the two institutes, as they were maneuvered along political and communal fault lines that separated the INC and the Muslim League. A hard fought battle for legitimacy ensued, at the end of which the IIIA moved to Pakistan and briefly co-existed in the same room with the newly founded PIIA, before folding in 1948.
Founding the Institute
In Chatham House. 14 As such, he sought to affiliate his institute with Chatham House. On account of "the poverty and general unpreparedness of India", he requested that Chatham House fund his endeavor in order to consider matters of international affairs seriously. 15 Macadam wrote to the India Office to investigate Sundaram and his institute. The request reached the Madras Government, which dismissed Sundaram as "an ardent Congressman with antiBritish views and bitterly hostile to the present policy of government". 16 The India Office counselled Chatham House to "wait and see whether the institute is capable of standing on its own legs before affording it assistance, and cautioned that "Sundaram himself is a man of no property and no profession, the son of a cook" and that his real aim was to secure himself a "lucrative Desai and Sarojini Naidu. 31 Although most of its council comprised of bureaucrats and politicians, the Institute sought a "non-political" character, precluding it from "expressing any opinion, from endorsing any policies, or from conducting any propaganda on any aspect of international affairs".
32
Its founding statement noted that its sole purpose was "encouraging and facilitating in India the scientific study of international questions". They soon became dysfunctional. Despite the initial fanfare, prior to WWII, the Institute "only had odd meetings", at which "the attendance was thin, the discussions on topics were poor and dull, and there was nothing of real interest in these activities". 37 The Calcutta branch closed in December 1940, while the Bombay branch "practically ceased activity". individual members and study groups by experts", 39 it conducted no research until the early 1940s. Indian IPR delegation would only be of service if "it is authentically Indian; if it gets its stimulus from the Pacific rather than from England, and if its development is on scientific rather than on political and government lines". 45 The possibility of such an institute, whose members were mostly Indian and was driven by its Indian rather than imperial outlook, without drawing its patronage and 39 Ibid., p. worldview from the colonial government, was impossible. 46 The IIIA, founded a year after this visit, had validated these concerns. Hence, Carter was keen to invite a delegation more "representative… of Indian citizens" than the IIIA. Shiva Rao, now increasingly resented the Institute"s pro-government outlook. The way the Mont Tremblant delegation was picked had proved to them that the Institute was a lackey of the government.
While the Indian delegation went to Mont Tremblant as an official delegation of the IIIA, the dissenters pointed that it had not organised any meetings to confirm these delegates, nor were other members consulted. Further, Mudaliar had ceased to be the chairperson of the Institute in October 1942 and had no right to choose the delegation on the Institute"s behalf. 67 After the government realized these procedural errors, Mudaliar accepted that the delegation did not represent the Institute as the Viceroy had appointed him in personal capacity to the delegation. Indeed, the delegation was funded by the Indian government.
68
At Mont Tremblant, anti-British sentiment, especially among the Americans and Chinese, was strong. Carter himself made no bones about it, especially on the issue of imperialism in India.
In discussions on the specially convened round table on India in the conference, the dominant mood was anti-British. An internal British memo noted "a plan by means of this Round Table for a Table, he alleged, was laden with an anti-British bias. 71 Carter, he wrote, was keen on opening a National Council of IPR in India which would be closer to Congress and posed "a danger of this organisation taking a communal bias and indulging merely in anti-British feelings". 81 This statement gestured towards the lack any serious research being undertaken by the IIIA, and its pro-government and non-representative character, which, given the growing likelihood of independence, made the Institute increasingly irrelevant.
Stung by these internal criticisms and pushed by the IPR, the IIIA was now keen to revitalise itself. At the behest of the government, many organisational changes were introduced. 
83
Although Ahmad promised institutional autonomy, this was almost immediately compromised when he requested government funding. This was particularly ironic, given that he was head of the government"s propaganda department. Nevertheless, the finance department quickly agreed to make a grant of Rs. 80,000 per annum for the first two years and an additional sum of Rs.10,000 for the library. 84 The only substantial non-government support came from Pattani who had promised a sum of Rs. 100,000 for building the new headquarters in Delhi. were also on the executive committee of the ICWA. 91 Over the next two years, the two institutes competed for legitimacy. They began producing research. After having published nothing in its first eight years, the IIIA published 17 pamphlets and organised 18 lectures in 1944. Likewise, by November 1945, the ICWA had published three monographs (with two more in press) and 8 pamphlets. It had also opened 11 branches across the country and formed two study groups on "India and Security in the Pacific" and "Progress towards Self-Government in Dependent Areas" in Delhi and Poona (Pune), respectively. 92 Both the Institutes started their flagships journals in January 1945. In its founding statement, the IIIA"s
Journal of the Indian Institute of International Affairs (JIIIA) stated that new awareness on foreign affairs was needed because having been "directly and fully involved in the war, India has become more than ever aware of her place in the world, more than eager to play her part in the world". 93 In contrast, the ICWA"s India Quarterly, brandishing its anti-government credentials, retorted: "The fact that India has had no share in the shaping of her foreign policy is largely responsible for the absence of an effective public opinion here on foreign affairs, but the same fact makes continued vigilance all the more essential". 94 In this sense, the ICWA and its journal was an attempt to project an international identity prior to independence, in response to the colonial government"s effort to control discourse on international affairs. India Quarterly's founding statement also implicitly critiqued the founding canard of Chatham House and its affiliate institutes that scientific study of international affairs will lead to peace. The newly recruited secretary of the ICWA and later the doyen of IR in India, Angadipuram Appadorai wrote in his editorial statement:
For publicists, similarly, to claim that their discussions, however, well-informed or dispassionate will set all things right is a piece of professional pedantry, for it ignores the basic fact that social progress is the result of interaction of several factors of which understanding is just one. reached an agreement about affiliation to an Indian institute, and wanted to avoid such a decision given the problems between the two institutions. 96 Gwyer met both Ahmad and Kunzru to devise a mechanism for Indian representation. He first suggested that the delegation be selected from members from both the institutes. Ahmad agreed to this on the condition that the delegation should officially be regarded as representing the IIIA. Kunzru rejected this. Gwyer then suggested a joint delegation without reference to either institute. This was acceptable to Kunzru but not Ahmad.
Unable to settle the conflict, Gwyer pointed out to Tarr Indian public opinion that it would with difficulty recover (sic)". 98 However, both Ahmad and
Mudaliar were now against affiliation with the IPR, given its favoring of the ICWA, in particular
Carter"s alleged role in the latter"s creation. 99 To find a way out of this conundrum, the IPR wrote to Chatham House for suggestions. The latter did not want to disappoint its affiliate in India nor be seen as partisan in India"s internal fight.
Through its representative at the IPR, Chatham House advised the IPR not to invite any Indian representation to the Conference. It also asked for the decision about affiliation to be postponed until the January Conference. 105 The IPR accepted the latter suggestion and wrote to the ICWA that the decision towards affiliation of a National Council in India could only be taken at the IPR Conference in January. 106 However, it was not ready to forgo Indian participation.
Tarr once again requested Maurice Gwyer to nominate his own delegation. He declined. 107 only two corporate members (the IIIA and the ICWA) and each would nominate exactly half the members. 110 Nothing came of these suggestions. Tarr worried that the two organisations were "digging in for a fight to the death". 111 They were.
The 'Fight to the Death'
While the IIIA was constantly under criticism for its official character, the Indian government and the India Office were keen to keep it alive. Both the India Office and the India External Affairs Department impressed upon Chatham House the need to find funding through alternative channels.
In an informal meeting between Olaf Caroe and Margaret Cleeve, the deputy secretary of the RIIA, 117 The membership remained low. 118 The recently restarted branches in Bombay and Calcutta had once again become non-functional. 119 In contrast, the ICWA grew in substance and stature. By the end of 1946, its membership was 1056 120 and it had 15 active branches across the country, apart from the headquarters in Delhi. 121 Although "nonpolitical" and "un-official", the ICWA was boosted by the presence of political stalwarts like Jawaharlal Nehru on its executive council.
The Asian Relations Conference of 1947 sealed the rivalry between the two organisations. catapulted the ICWA into limelight. 122 The Conference further sharpened the divide between the its 215 members still lived in India. Many suggested that Hasan might let it "die a natural death".
128
It is unclear how matters were finally settled, but some evidence suggests that an Extraordinary
General Meeting was called in Karachi towards the end of 1948 to formally dissolve the Indian Institute.
129

Conclusion
In narrating this story, this paper makes four interventions into the history of IR in India. First, it reveals the depth of history that IR in India has beyond Nehru and ICWA. Nehru"s contribution to the development of IR in India is surely deserving of strong emphasis, but the context of IR"s emergence in India was actually imperialism, which sparked a strong nationalist backlash. Second, this account allows us to re-interpret the institutional identities of two current South Asian research institutions, the ICWA and the PIIA. It is interesting to note that on their websites, the two institutes narrate their own stories very differently. 130 The PIIA sees itself as an institutional successor to the is not a solitary one, but forms a part of the broader politics of the role of institutions in particular forms of knowledge creation. Finally, it shows us the colonial government"s attempt to control the study of international affairs in India, and how the competing nationalist movements began to unwind this control, in an effort to project new international identities just prior to independence.
